Antireligious Politics in Kazan'

Revolution and Civil War
The First Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1920s and 1930s
World War II and the Post-War Period
The Second Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1960s
The Period after Khrushchev
Literature

Revolution and Civil War

As Marxism-Leninism asserts, religion and communism are incompatible, all religions should 'disappear' during the building of the classless communist society. As such, the Bolsheviki worked towards this goal at the outset. During the Civil War (1918-1921), religious policy was deeply shaped by pragmatism. Clergymen who had called upon the people to fight against the Red Army or actively supported the Whites - as the "liberators of Russia from the godless power" - were arrested and killed. Generally speaking, in their anti-religious action the Bolsheviki used two methods against all followers of different denominations: they destroyed the institutional framework of each particular religious group and waged a propagandist fight against "religious consciousness", that is, against religion in everyday life, in customs and tradition, in feasts and generally in the resume of "new men".

The First Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1920s and 1930s

As a result of these politics the number of Orthodox clergymen dramatically decreased until the early 1930s - it was achieved by assassination, camp detention, emigration or abandonment of the priest office. Furthermore, a large part of the Orthodox churches throughout the Soviet Union was closed. Although only approximately the half of Kazan population consisted of Orthodox Russians (Muslim Tatars represented the second largest group), the city was no exception to this development. Until 1939 all the Orthodox churches in Kazan were closed - the only exception being the Church Jaroslavskikh Chulotvortsev. The mechanism of the closings worked along the same lines: a public meeting, in which the believers usually did not take part, made an application for closing the church; the application was passed on to the official authorities (who, from 1931 onwards, was the Commission for Cultic Questions at the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Republic of Tatarstan); finally, the closure was usually authorized and carried out. This procedure created the impression that the "working class" itself was anti-religious and spontaneously interested in the elimination of all "religious survivals". But the fight against religion was not only aimed against religious buildings but also against religious everyday life as well as against the cultural and traditional practices which the church had created for the believers. A number of prescriptions in the 1920s considerably restricted the scope of action for churches and believers in practicing religion. Separation of church and state (1918), confiscation of church property (1922), obligation for religious groups to register with the authorities (1923) and the ban of "religious propaganda" and religious education (1929) limited the churches' and churchgoers' possibilities of practicing religion. In addition, antireligious propaganda - which was driven by the "Allunion Association of the Godless" since 1925 - contributed a great deal to the decline of religious life in the Soviet Union generally, and particularly in Kazan.
The transfer of antireligious policies (which were based on the fight against Russian Orthodoxy) to other religions that differed considerably from the Orthodox Church was particularly difficult. Islam in the Soviet Union was much less institutionalized than Orthodox Christianity; religious ideas here were tightly linked to ethnic, cultural and political categories. Muslim denominations in the first years of Soviet power were less exposed to antireligious measures than the Orthodox Church. Muslim-Tatar culture in this "quiet period" could develop further. Muslim educational institutions - mainly the Madaaris, the spiritual colleges - enjoyed a large clientele. Only from 1927 onwards did Soviet authorities take action against the Muslim clergy, and even then it was unsystematic. In the course of agrarian collectivization and forced industrialization from 1929 onwards, anti-religious measures took on a systematic character. The accusation against Muslim clergy changed from "religious agitation" to an "Anti-Kolkhos" or "Anti-Kulakment movement" (rich peasantry). Until the end of the 1930s, all the mosques in the city of Kazan - with the exception of the Mardzhani mosque - were closed together with all the religious educational institutions; clergymen were, for the most part, imprisoned or forced into labor camps. Nevertheless, even if Muslim religious life came to a standstill (as was expected under the guise of Marxist-Leninism), the great numbers of mosque-goers revealed that a plethora of people had preserved their "religious consciousness," i.e. at high religious feasts.

World War II and the Post-War Period

The Stalinist period - which was shaped by rigorous actions against religion from the outset, and then changed during World War II to offer concessions to religious communities - found its end with Stalin's death in March 1953. As such, the coexistence of church and state was silently accepted until the end of the 1950s. Some churches were reopened - e.g. the Church in Kazan - and clergymen could be educated at religious institutions such as a madrasah or different Orthodox seminaries; in other words, religion seemed to have found its position in Soviet Union.

The Second Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1960s

Nevertheless, at the 21st Party Convention at the beginning of 1959, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) projected a Communist society which was meant to be achieved in the near future: "One of the main tasks for ideological work is the overcoming of the remains of capitalism in the consciousness of the people, the fight against bourgeois ideology ... A significant position in this occupies the fight against religious remains, the mobilization of scientific atheist propaganda"(Pravda, 4.4.1959, p.4)
Antireligious policies were endorsed again, but this time they took on other dimensions than in the 1920s and 1930s. Now, it was perceived, religion should be eradicated subtly. In newspapers, articles regularly appeared which condemned religion as "anti-scientific" or as "a residue of the past" or "of capitalism." This new wave of propaganda was found not only in the press, but also in official institutions, at work and at school. The space for religious life was restricted; the clergy was repressed yet again. True, assassinations and arrests did not occur this time, but religion could only be practiced in secret, and under great risk. Access to churches and mosques was prohibited for children and teenagers under 18 and religious services were partly limited to the night-hours. Amongst the believers were informers of the official organs who passed on the names of religious activists. Such denunciations could lead to discrimination in everyday life, and 'punishment' ranged from work restrictions, to new-housing denials or the loss of parental rights. In the latter, believers' children would occasionally be forced into state children's home or boarding schools. Clergymen were now victims of campaigns which called them "parasites" and dismissed them from office under the accusation of tax crimes. As such, Kazan bishop Iob was punished to three year of detention in 1960 because of alleged hidden incomes and tax misappropriation. The sentence more likely traces back to his protest against church closures in the countryside than to deception.
Guiding principles of the new antireligious wave in the years from 1959 to 1964 in Kazan remains to be analysed in detail, even if the essential features are clearly visible. The measures taken aimed at religious byt - that is, against religion in everyday life; byt should be eradicated by means of propaganda and by subtle repression against clergymen and believers of both religious groups in Kazan. The Orthodox Church and its practical religious forms was the main target of propaganda, whereas Islam was combated rather marginally. The project "Regional memory in Kazan" tries to enunciate the logic that shaped measures in the 1960s by means of the oral history of those affected amongst the inhabitants of Kazan.

The Period after Khrushchev

After the dismissal of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in 1964 the repressive measures lost momentum. Admittedly, there was no religious blossoming in the 1970s; rather, religion was increasingly seen as less significant. Only at the end of the Soviet Union did the topic of religion receive popularity, and the different religious groups enjoyed a large clientele up to now. In Kazan, a great deal of mosques and churches were restored, reopened or rebuilt; religious schools are in great demand and do not have to advertise for new recruits. Religion has survived 70 years of atheist policies and nowadays appears as an omnipresent phenomenon of the New Russia - particularly in the city of Kazan.

Antireligious Politics in Kazan'

Revolution and Civil War

The First Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1920s and 1930s

World War II and the Post-War Period

The Second Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1960s

The Period after Khrushchev

At the top of time
"And the fifth day God created the periodical system" (in: Krokodil, 20.01.1964, p.8)

Further Reading

Antireligious Politics in Kazan'

Revolution and Civil War

The First Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1920s and 1930s

World War II and the Post-War Period

The Second Wave of Antireligious Politics: the 1960s

The Period after Khrushchev

At the top of time"And the fifth day God created the periodical system" (in: Krokodil, 20.01.1964, p.8)

Further Reading

At the top of time
"And the fifth day God created the periodical system" (in: Krokodil, 20.01.1964, p.8)